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SKILLS DIVERSITY IN UNITY
INNA GRINIS*
Abstract. At any point in time, skills gaps, mismatches, and shortages arise because
of an imperfect correspondence between the singular sets of skills required by diﬀerent
open vacancies and the unique combinations of capabilities embodied in every job
seeker - skills diversity in unity. This paper ﬁrst constructs an abstract framework for
deﬁning and thinking about these phenomena in a uniﬁed, formal and objective way.
The main building block is a discrete skills space in which the locations of vacancies
and workers are determined by the vectors of skills characterizing them. We deﬁne
skills gaps and mismatches as two diﬀerent distance measures between them, and
derive a condition for each vacancy that determines whether or not it experiences a
skills shortage. We then develop a job matching model with imperfect information, in
which skills mismatches inﬂuence the job application decisions of the workers, while
skills gaps and shortages shape the competition for workers on the resulting bipartite
job applications network. The tools proposed in this paper could in future work be
employed as the main ingredients of an agent-based model used to investigate how
skills gaps, mismatches and shortages aﬀect equilibrium outcomes in the context of
skills diversity in unity and imperfect information.
1. Introduction
“At bottom every man knows well enough that he is a unique
being, only once on this earth; and by no extraordinary chance
will such a marvelously picturesque piece of diversity in unity as
he is, ever be put together a second time.”
Friedrich Nietzsche [28]
There has been a lot of debate around the notions of skills gaps, mismatches, and
shortages. Some academics completely deny these issues, for instance disparaging skills
gaps as a “zombie idea” (Krugman [22]) or “employer whining” (Cappelli [5]).
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At the same time, however, numerous surveys conducted by governmental bodies
(e.g. the European Commission [8], the UK Commission for Employment and Skills
(UKCES) [18]), lobbying organisations (e.g. the Confederation of British Industry
(CBI) [6]), and consulting companies (e.g. KPMG [6], ManpowerGroup [25], Hays and
Oxford Economics [16]), have been reporting skills gaps and shortages as main obstacles
to business operations and a “handbrake on global growth” (Cox [16]) for years. Both
public and private sectors spend large amounts of money on investigating and trying
to reduce them. For example, in 2013, J.P. Morgan Chase launched a $250 million
initiative “New Skills at Work”, with their CEO Jamie Dimon quoting the nearly 11
million unemployed Americans and the concurrent 4 million unﬁlled jobs as evidence of
there being a “gulf between the skills job seekers currently have and the skills employers
need to ﬁll their open positions”[10]. Such concerns also play an important role in
shaping migration policies - e.g. the UKCES reviews were commissioned by the UK
Migration Advisory Committee (MAC). Hence, the evidence is not just a “telephone
survey [with] executives” (Krugman [22]).
On the workers’ side, many labour economists and special institutions (e.g. the
European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop) [13]) have
extensively studied and documented skills mismatches, the related phenomena of under
and over-education (McGuinness [26], Sattinger [35]), and their dire consequences for
wages, job satisfaction, and career prospects (e.g. Allen & Van der Velden [2]). In
the UK, for instance, according to the ONS [12], 47% of recent graduates were in
non-graduate employment in 2013, and the ﬁgure was already high even before the
recession, e.g., at 43% in 2007. This constitutes a substantial waste of resources and
leads to the following puzzle: why aren’t job seekers acquiring the skills needed by
employers, thereby eliminating skills gaps, mismatches, and shortages?
The proponents of the idea that skills gaps, mismatches, and shortages are just a
“myth” add to the perplexity by saying that if these phenomena did exist in reality, we
would observe tight labour market conditions (high wages, low unemployment rates) for
those workers who have the scarce skills, but we do not. In a recent article, Shierholz
[36] shows evidence for the USA that “unemployed workers dramatically outnumber
job openings in all sectors” and “in no occupation is there any hint of wages being bid
up in a way that would indicate tight labor markets or labor shortages”. According to
her, it is therefore “aggregate demand”, and not structural skills issues, that is behind
the weak job recoveries and high non-graduate employment levels of recent graduates.
Although this view is plausible, it seems to ignore the fact that despite recession-
related rises, the numbers and concerns around skills gaps, shortages, and mismatches
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have been high throughout the business cycle, and this persistence over time might
actually be the reason why the “zombie idea [...] refuses to die” (Krugman, [22]).
Perhaps all the debate about the existence and importance of skills gaps, shortages,
and mismatches is the result of the ambiguity in their deﬁnitions, and the little attention
paid to the notion of skills diversity in unity. The easiest way to understand the latter
idea, is to talk to an actual recruiter who might tell you a story about overqualiﬁed
applicants not being hired because they exhibited a lack of communication skills during
interviews. In general, the “lack” is more substantial, but the key intuition is the
same. At any point in time, skills gaps, mismatches, and shortages arise because of an
imperfect correspondence between the singular sets of skills required by diﬀerent open
vacancies and the unique combinations of capabilities embodied in every job seeker.
Our paper aims to contribute to this debate by proposing tools, which, in future work,
could be employed as the main ingredients of an agent-based model used to investigate
how skills gaps, mismatches and shortages aﬀect equilibrium outcomes in the context
of skills diversity in unity and imperfect information.
In Section 3, we develop an abstract framework for deﬁning skills gaps, mismatches
and shortages geometrically and thinking about these phenomena in a uniﬁed, formal
way. The main building block is a discrete skills space in which the locations of vacancies
and workers are determined by the vectors of skills characterizing them. We deﬁne skills
gaps and mismatches as two diﬀerent distance measures between them. Conceptualising
skills shortages - which occur “when there are not enough people available with the
skills needed to do the jobs which need to be done” (British Government’s Training
Agency [1]) - is more complex. The “not enough” notion implies that skills shortages
are not pairwise independent like skills gaps and mismatches. Hence, their existence for
diﬀerent vacancies, and the policies aimed at eliminating them cannot be considered in
isolation. This highlights the importance and advantage of using a measurable skills
space which directly accounts for interdependencies in a given economy, and provides a
clear condition for each vacancy that determines whether or not it experiences a skills
shortage. We also show how to determine minimum levels of skills mismatches and
skills gaps achievable in an economy if the goal is to simultaneously reduce the number
of unmatched agents (unemployed workers and unﬁlled vacancies).
The second part (Section 4) develops a two-sided job matching model with imper-
fect information, in which skills mismatches inﬂuence the job application decisions of
the workers, while skills gaps and shortages shape the competition for workers on the
resulting bipartite job applications network. A preliminary R code ﬁle for simulating
the spatial structure and the competitive wage adjustment mechanism is available on
request.
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2. Related Literature
This paper can be related to diﬀerent areas of theoretical and empirical literature in
economics and networks, and management (operations research). In this section, we
outline the main diﬀerences and similarities, and motivate our modelling approach.
The ﬁrst papers in economics that pay attention to the notion of skills are Roy [33] and
Tinbergen [39], both published in 1951. Tinbergen’s discussion of skills heterogeneity is
close to the one we present below. He recognizes that “many types of employment [...]
require certain abilities in varying degrees”, so that “in reality, [...] multi-dimensional
descriptions of the nature of occupations [...] have to be considered”. However, despite
these statements, Tinbergen then assumes that “the nature of the labour required
is a one-dimensional quantity”, summarized by “one number s”, and interpreted as
“physical eﬀort”. Since Tinbergen intends to investigate the distribution of labour
incomes, this simpliﬁcation seems appropriate and useful in order to get analytical
results. However, for the analysis of skills mismatches, gaps, and shortages, it is too
restrictive because it leads to ignoring a scenario where people have multiple skills and
hence diﬀerent abilities in performing diﬀerent jobs. For instance, worker A may be
more productive in job X than worker B, while B would be more productive than A in
another job Y.
Roy [33] was the ﬁrst economist to clearly understand this, and also to recognise
that this implies self-selection: A would choose to work in job X, while B - in job Y.
The main diﬀerence between our conception of skills heterogeneity and Roy’s, is that
in Roy’s multiple-index model workers have several types of skills but can only use one
skill at a time depending on which occupation they choose. By contrast, we assume
that both workers and jobs are characterized by multi-dimensional vectors of skills, and
production is decreasing in the skills gap between the skills required by the vacancy
and those possessed by the worker.
The main contribution of these two early papers is that they generated a substantial
literature in which skills diversity plays a key role.
Assignment models that started with Sattinger [34]1 assume inﬁnite numbers of
worker and job types. However, as in Tinbergen [39], heterogeneity in these models
is typically deﬁned along one dimension only: from low to high ability for workers,
and from easy to complex for jobs/tasks. Another diﬀerence with our approach is that
these models usually require perfect information about all employers’ wage oﬀers and
all workers’ abilities. As discussed below, we assume the worker does not observe the
1Teulings & Vieira [38] show how assignment models can be estimated, while Shimer [37] proposes a
version with coordination frictions.
SKILLS DIVERSITY IN UNITY 5
job requirements and the wage oﬀers of all employers; he just applies to a vacancy
with some probability that is increasing in the ex-ante (before any network-induced
competition for him) utility that he would get if employed in this position. Similarly,
employers are unaware of the distribution of workers, but they can perfectly observe the
skills of those who do apply for their vacancy (by, for instance, inviting the candidates
to interviews).
Despite these diﬀerences, assignment models are close to our approach to the extent
that skills diversity in them is also the main driving force behind the matching of work-
ers and jobs. In particular, the allocation of workers to jobs in assignment models is
governed by heterogeneity in either productivities (more able workers have a compara-
tive advantage in more complex jobs, cf. Sattinger [34]), or preferences (workers have
diﬀerent tastes for performing diverse tasks, cf. Tinbergen [40]). In our model, skills
mismatches inﬂuence job application decisions, while skills gaps and shortages shape
the competition for workers on the resulting bipartite job applications network.
The skills space we use to model skills diversity and deﬁne skills gaps, mismatches,
and shortages is similar in some respects to the “characteristics” space that forms the
basis of hedonic models. Although the ﬁrst instances of such models were developed
to study diﬀerentiated products (Lancaster [24], Rosen [30]), the same approach has
later been applied to labour markets (e.g. Heckman and Scheinkman [17]). The main
idea is that products (workers) are “collections of characteristics” (Lancaster [24]) that
yield utility (productive eﬃciency). By assuming n sectors with diﬀerent production
functions, Heckman and Scheinkman [17] also introduce heterogeneity on the labour
demand side. However, by contrast with our approach, they do not directly map their
jobs onto the same characteristics space as the one used to conceptualize their workers
and do not explicitly model how the diﬀerent measures of divergences between the skills
vectors supplied and those demanded aﬀect utility and production.
Perhaps the most important diﬀerence between the models discussed so far and the
approach we take in this paper lies in the pricing of skills. In both hedonic and assign-
ment models, the prices of diﬀerent types of skills (characteristics) are determined by
equilibrium between their supplies and demands. Although Heckman and Scheinkman
[17] show that “whenever population skill endowments are “diverse” enough”, skills
bundling matters so that “separate productive attributes” command diﬀerent prices
in diﬀerent sectors, they do not depart from the assumption that there exists a direct
mapping from the characteristics of a person to the wage received. After rejecting
empirically the hypothesis of uniform factor prices in US sectoral data, they propose
factor immobility and non-linear hedonic pricing as alternative explanations, and even
suggest that a linear characteristics pricing approach (Lancaster [24]) could still hold
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within sectors. The reason we wish to depart from the assumption of a direct mapping
from characteristics to the wages observed, even accounting for bundling, is because it
leads to an important puzzle in the analysis of skills gaps, mismatches, and shortages. If
in equilibrium workers are paid according to the overall marginal product and scarcity
of their bundles of skills within sectors, why don’t rational people recognize the highly
valuable types of sector-speciﬁc skills and acquire them, thereby eliminating shortage
related arbitrage opportunities? Preferences, timing, costs are of course potential rea-
sons. However, another possible explanation is that the hedonic approach does not fully
account for the multifaceted role that skills diversity plays in the job matching process
and the formation of competitive wages.
In the spatial competitive labour market model proposed below (Section 4), skills
shortages can induce competition for those workers who possess the scarce bundles, but
not necessarily so. The pricing is done through a completely diﬀerent mechanism in
which workers are not necessarily rewarded according to the value of their marginal
products and the scarcity of their skills combinations.
To reach these conclusions, we start by recognising that, in reality, a ﬁrm could only
hire a worker who has applied for its open vacancy. It is important to understand why
workers apply to some jobs and not to others, and why diﬀerent workers choose to
apply to diﬀerent numbers of vacancies. In particular, our goal is to investigate how
skills heterogeneity inﬂuences such decisions.
Several approaches have been used in the economic literature to model the application
process (ﬁrst stage of the job matching). Undirected search models (Pissarides [29]) as-
sume that workers and ﬁrms meet at random, thereby completely ignoring heterogeneity
and the fact that workers should apply with a higher probability to jobs that would
potentially give them higher utility. Directed search models (e.g. Moen [27], Galenianos
& Kircher [15], Shimer [37]) do take this into account. However, they require workers
to be able to observe all job oﬀers, and design application strategies that are optimal
given all other agents’ strategies. Hence, when applying to jobs, workers must not only
have perfect information, but also a certain level of strategic sophistication.
In order to avoid such unrealistic assumptions, we propose a novel approach that
takes inspiration from the literature on spatial networks where link formation depends
on distances (Janssen [20]). Speciﬁcally, we assume that for each worker, there exists
a latent ranking of all vacancies which depends on skills mismatches and base wages
that together determine ex-ante utility as deﬁned in Section 4. The worker does not
need to perfectly observe this latent ranking, whose sole function is to determine the
probability distribution over the vacancies with which the worker applies to each of
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them. We also extend this basic set-up to allow for several and diﬀerent numbers of
applications per worker.
The simultaneous application decisions of all workers determine a bipartite network
in which a link from a worker to an open vacancy corresponds to a job application. The
competitive matching of workers and ﬁrms as well as the equilibrium wages depend
on this network, as it determines the outside opportunities of both ﬁrms and workers.
Firms that receive several applications for a given vacancy have to choose one among
the diﬀerent candidates, while job seekers who receive multiple oﬀers can only accept
one of them at the end of the negotiations.
Kranton & Minehart [21] provide one of the ﬁrst analysis of competition on bipartite
networks. However, the competitive mechanism devised in their paper would be inap-
propriate in our context because of heterogeneity. Although they show how competitive
equilibrium outcomes are inﬂuenced by the whole structure of the bipartite buyer-seller
network in which the outside opportunities “depend on the entire web of direct and
indirect links”; the good exchanged in the process is homogeneous in the sense that a
buyer’s valuation for the good does not change depending on the seller from whom he
acquires it. Similarly, sellers do not care about the buyers’ identities, but only the price
they receive for their good.
Instead, to model competition on the bipartite job applications network, we use a
two-sided matching model. In existing economic theory, the matching literature which
started with Gale & Shapley [14] probably provides the most general way of conceptu-
alising heterogeneity in market-like settings. The competitive wage-adjustment mecha-
nism we propose in Section 4 is related to the one in Crawford & Knoer [9]. Within the
mechanism design literature, the main contribution of their paper is to recognize that
in labour markets, agents’ preferences need to be modelled as ﬂexible because they
can change over the negotiation process in which salaries adjust competitively. De-
spite being quite general, their model assumes perfect information, and as the authors
argue themselves this is disadvantageous since “imperfect information is an essential
characteristic of real labor market”. Indeed, two-sided matching models usually in-
volve algorithms that require each agent to be able to rank all agents on the opposite
side, which is implausible in settings with large numbers of heterogeneous agents. This
perfect information assumption might therefore be one of the main reasons why, de-
spite their attractive and intuitive approach in such environments, two-sided matching
models have not been more widely used in studying large real labour markets2.
2They have been successfully applied in smaller settings, where agents on both sides can provide a
complete ranking of all the agents on the opposite side of the market. See Roth and Sotomayor [32]
for a textbook exposition of two-sided matching models and a discussion of their applications in the
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Furthermore, even though heterogeneity in two-sided matching models has impor-
tant implications for equilibrium outcomes, it remains unfounded, i.e., these models
do not explain why some worker-ﬁrm pairs produce more or less, and yield more or
less job satisfaction to the worker. They simply take pair-speciﬁc productivity and job
satisfaction levels as exogenously given.
We try to address both issues by modelling skills diversity explicitly in Section 3,
incorporating it directly into agents’ preferences and job application decisions in Sec-
tions 4.1 and 4.2 respectively, then building a two-sided matching model on this spatial
framework in Section 4.3.
Finally, our paper can also be related to the large empirical literature devoted to un-
derstanding skills mismatches and the related phenomena of under and over-education
(cf., for instance, Sattinger [35] for a very detailed overview of the literature on qualita-
tive mismatches, their causes and consequences), while Section 3.4 employs some ideas
and techniques from the operations research literature (e.g. Eiselt & Sandblom [11]).
The discussion presented in this section shows that despite the “little attention [con-
ventional] economic theory pays to the notion of skill” (UKCES [18]), often treating
labour as a homogeneous good, many economists have actually pondered over skills
and skills diversity/heterogeneity. The diﬀerences with our approach arise because the
models reviewed above had been developed for diﬀerent purposes.
Unfortunately, no clear and objective deﬁnitions of skills gaps, mismatches and short-
ages exist in the academic literature, where skills shortages, for instance, are often un-
derstood as a phenomenon that “causes vacancies to remain open longer” (Haskel &
Martin [19]) and unﬁlled vacancies constitute “dynamic shortages”, which only persist
until wages have risen such as to make enough people acquire the scarce skills and
bring the labour market into equilibrium once again (Arrow and Capron [4]). How-
ever, in practice, hiring diﬃculties, unﬁlled vacancies, wage rises, etc. are all potential
consequences of shortages, not their proper deﬁnition. Hiring diﬃculties and unﬁlled
vacancies may occur for reasons unrelated to shortages, like ineﬃcient human resource
recruiters, improper advertising of the job, etc., while raising wages is only one of many
responses to shortages. For instance, the 2016/2017 Talent shortage survey conducted
by ManpowerGroup [25] indicates that only 26% of employers respond to shortages
by “paying higher salary packages to recruits”. At the same time, 53% decide to “of-
fer training and development to existing staﬀ”, 36% “recruit outside the talent pool”,
28% “explore alternative sourcing strategies”, 19% completely “change existing work
models”, etc.
labour market for medical interns and college admissions mechanisms. Such models have also been
used in “repugnant markets”, e.g. kidney exchanges (Roth et al. [31]).
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In the next section, we shall attempt to start ﬁlling this theoretical gap by proposing
basic, geometric deﬁnitions of skills gaps, mismatches and shortages in a uniﬁed setting.
3. Modelling and Measuring Skills Diversity in Unity
The purpose of this section is to model skills diversity among workers and vacancies,
and propose clear deﬁnitions of skills mismatches, gaps and shortages. Governments
around the world have been concerned about skills gaps and mismatches and also want
to minimize the numbers of unemployed workers and unﬁlled vacancies. In Section
3.4, we show that in an economy with a realistic degree of skills heterogeneity and
no perfect coordination between the combinations of skills supplied and demanded,
there will always be some positive minimum levels of skills gaps and mismatches if the
objective is also to leave as few unmatched agents as possible.
3.1. Participants and skills space. The economy is composed of two ﬁnite and
disjoint sets of open vacancies V = {V1, V2, ..., VM}, and job seekers (workers) S =
{S1, S2, ..., SN}, with cardinalities |V| = M and |S| = N respectively. We use i and Si,
j and Vj interchangeably when referring to workers and vacancies respectively.
Consider an n-dimensional discrete skills space Ω, where each element is an n × 1
skills vector ω =< ω1, ω2, ..., ωn >. Each component of the skills vector ωl ∈ [0, ω¯l], for
l = 1, ..., n, corresponds to some speciﬁc type of skills (e.g. presentation skills, computer
skills, teamwork, etc.). We shall assume that ωl is discrete and varies between 0 (no
l-type skills) and ω¯l (expert in l-type skills). For some types of skills, ωl will be a binary
variable {0, 1} indicating whether or not the type of skills is possessed/required, while
in other cases the value of ωl will summarize the level of proﬁciency in the type of skills
considered. Concisely, Ω = Cn
⋂
Z
n where Cn = [0, ω¯1]× [0, ω¯2]× ...× [0, ω¯n] for some
positive integers ω¯l, l = 1, ..., n.
We map both workers and vacancies onto this skills space, i.e. each worker i ∈ S
corresponds to an n-dimensional non-negative vector of skills or capabilities si =<
s1i, s2i, ..., sni > in Ω. Similarly, each vacancy j ∈ V corresponds to an n-dimensional
vector vj ∈ Ω of skills required to perform job j, i.e. vj is the skills vector that the
benchmark candidate for vacancy j would possess. For simplicity, we assume that one
ﬁrm is responsible for one vacancy only and therefore use the terms vacancy, job, ﬁrm,
and employer interchangeably.3
3A possible extension for future research would be to consider more complex scenarios in which one
ﬁrm simultaneously opens several vacancies, and can hire workers such as to compensate to some
extent the skills deﬁciencies of ones by skills surpluses of others while still minimizing the overall skills
gap of the whole team as deﬁned in eq.3.2.
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Note that although we use si and vj when referring to workers and vacancies re-
spectively, both types of vectors belong to the same skills space Ω. Moreover, the
characterization of workers and vacancies could be made as precise as needed by simply
increasing the dimensionality of the skills space; e.g. instead of just having “computer
skills”, we could include more skills types to capture proﬁciency with diﬀerent types of
computer software. In particular, uniqueness could be reached by setting a degree of
heterogeneity n < ∞ such that no two workers and no two vacancies are the same. Al-
though this is not necessary, we shall assume such a degree of skills diversity in section
4 in order to simplify some of the proofs, leaving the more general case as an extension
for future research.
3.2. Skills mismatches and skills gaps. Consider an arbitrary job seeker i and an
arbitrary vacancy j. As long as the vectors characterizing them in the skills space Ω
do not coincide, it is possible to compute a distance between them. We deﬁne skills
mismatches and skills gaps as two diﬀerent distance measures:
Deﬁnition 1. The skills mismatch between worker i ∈ S and vacancy j ∈ V , smij,
is the Euclidean distance on Ω between the vectors si and vj:
(3.1) smij =‖ vj − si ‖=
√√√√ n∑
l=1
(vlj − sli)2
Since smij is a measure of the overall distance between worker i and vacancy j, it
increases both when the worker is overskilled and when he/she is underskilled in some
skill type(s).
Deﬁnition 2. The skills gap between worker i ∈ S and vacancy j ∈ V , sgij, is a
measure of skills deﬁciency :
(3.2) sgij =
n∑
l=1
max {0, vlj − sli}
The skills gap only increases when the worker lacks some of the skills that are neces-
sary for the job (vlj − sli > 0).
The pairwise skills mismatches and skills gaps between all workers and vacancies in
the economy can be summarized by two NxM matrices SM and SG. For instance:
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SG =
⎡
⎢⎣
sg11 ... sg1M
...
. . .
...
sgN1 . . . sgNM
⎤
⎥⎦
i.e. the ith row of SG records the skills gaps of worker i with all open vacancies,
whereas column j of SG contains the skills gaps that vacancy j has with respect to all
job seekers.
Letting δl = vlj − sli, it becomes clear that both smij and sgij are speciﬁc cases of a
more general distance measure deﬁned as:
(3.3) dij =
n∑
l=1
f(δl)
where f(.) is a monotonically increasing function in δl.
Skills gaps and skills mismatches therefore correspond to two diﬀerent ways of per-
ceiving and measuring divergences between the skills combinations embodied in the
workers and those required by the open vacancies. Throughout the paper, we assume
that workers care only about skills mismatches, since being employed in a job that
matches their skills endowments more closely is both more satisfying and requires less
extra eﬀort. At the same time, employers are only concerned with skills gaps because
any skills deﬁciency negatively aﬀects their productivity.
Of course, in reality each agent probably has his/her own subjective perception of
skills diversity, and the function f(.) in eq.3.3 could be made agent and/or dimension-
dependent to reﬂect this. For instance, when thinking about skills gaps, an employer
might allow over-skills in some dimensions to compensate for under-skills in other ones,
or penalize under-skilling in diﬀerent dimensions diﬀerently. However, for simplicity
and clarity purposes, we shall focus on skills mismatches and skills gaps as deﬁned in
equations 3.1 and 3.2.
A simple example that illustrates why it is important to separate skills mismatches
from skills gaps is to consider a higher education graduate and two non-graduate vacan-
cies: a barman and a plumber. Being a barman does not necessitate very speciﬁc skills,
hence the skills gap between the higher education graduate and the barman vacancy
is likely to be very small. However, the skills mismatch may be huge since the higher
education graduate won’t be able to use many of his skills if employed as a barman.
By contrast, consider the higher education graduate and the plumber vacancy. This
time, both the skills gap and the skills mismatch are likely to be large if the higher
education graduate happens to know nothing about plumbing because a plumber is a
non-graduate vacancy that requires speciﬁc skills.
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3.3. Measure space and skills shortages. According to the British Government’s
Training Agency, a skills shortage occurs “when there are not enough people available
with the skills needed to do the jobs which need to be done” (British Government’s
Training Agency [1]). Using the deﬁnitions introduced previously, a worker who has
all the skills needed to do a particular job is someone who has a zero skills gap with
this job. Eq.3.2 implies that such a qualiﬁed worker does not necessarily have to match
a vacancy’s requirements perfectly; he/she can be overskilled in some types of skills.
Since a worker can therefore be qualiﬁed for many diﬀerent jobs at the same time, the
question of establishing whether or not there are “enough” qualiﬁed people available
in the economy to “do the jobs which need to be done”, i.e. to ﬁll all open vacancies,
seems rather non-trivial.
Indeed, contrary to skills mismatches and gaps, which are both measures that are
speciﬁc to a certain worker-vacancy pair - i.e. i′s skills gap and mismatch with vacancy j
are unrelated to his/her skills gap and mismatch with a diﬀerent vacancy h - the question
of skills shortages cannot be treated in isolation. Hence, before proposing an objective
condition that determines whether or not a vacancy experiences a skills shortage, we
need to characterize the measure space of the economy in which vacancies and job
seekers co-exist. This shall allow us to model their interdependence and conceptualize
the “not enough” notion.
3.3.1. Measure space. The distribution of the combinations of skills available in the
labour market (skills supply) deﬁnes a measure P on Ω. For instance, if the pool of job
seekers is such that none of them has a speciﬁc combination of skills ω, i.e. si = ω for
all i ∈ S , this outcome will have measure zero under P , i.e. P (ω) = 0. Furthermore,
this measure is such that:
(3.4) P (ω) = |{i ∈ S|si = ω}|
where |.| is the cardinality of the subset.
Hence the measure satisﬁes:
P (Ω) =
∑
ω∈Ω
P (ω) = N
In a similar way, we can deﬁne a measure Q for the vectors of skills demanded to
ﬁll open vacancies. If none of the vacancies requires some combination of skills ω - i.e.
vj = ω for all j ∈ V , Q shall assign measure zero to this speciﬁc skills vector: Q(ω) = 0.
Again, this measure is such that:
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(3.5) Q(ω) = |{j ∈ V|vj = ω}|
and satisﬁes:
Q(Ω) =
∑
ω∈Ω
Q(ω) = M
Consider the subset of all the job seekers whose skills gaps with vacancy j, as deﬁned
in eq.3.2, are zero. Their corresponding skills vectors lie in:
(3.6) Zj := {ω ∈ Ω|ωl  vlj, ∀l = 1, ..., n}
This includes the workers who possess exactly the vj skills vector, as well as those who
are overskilled in some type(s) of skills required by vacancy j but underskilled in none
of them.
Notes: The shaded area marks the skills
vectors of all the workers who would be
qualiﬁed for vacancy V1. Only worker
S2 has such a combination of skills. S1 is
underskilled along the horizontal dimen-
sion.
Figure 3.1: Qualiﬁed workers
Let us call a job seeker i with si ∈ Zj as qualiﬁed
for vacancy j. Note that, even if the benchmark
candidate for vacancy j is absent from the labour
force (P (vj) = 0), vacancy j might still be able to
hire a qualiﬁed worker as long as P (Zj) > 0.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the idea in a two-
dimensional space. The labour market is com-
posed of one vacancy and two workers character-
ized by the vectors v1 =< 5, 6 >, s1 =< 3, 8 >,
and s2 =< 7, 7 > respectively. The shaded area
to the North-East of vacancy 1 corresponds to Z1
as deﬁned in eq.3.6. Only worker 2 (s2) belongs
to Z1, despite worker 1 (s1) being overskilled for
vacancy 1 (v1) along the vertical dimension.
Let Z be the σ-algebra (collection of sub-
sets of Ω) generated by the sets Zω :=
{u ∈ Ω|ul  ωl, ∀l = 1, ..., n} for any ω ∈ Ω.
The measure space for this economy is deﬁned
as the unique quadruple Ψ = {Ω,Z, P,Q}.
As long as some workers are qualiﬁed for several
vacancies at the same time, the question of whether or not a given vacancy is experienc-
ing a skills shortage, in the sense of there not being enough qualiﬁed job seekers, cannot
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be addressed by looking at this speciﬁc vacancy in isolation. Instead, the vacancy has to
be considered within the complete measure space characterizing the economy in which
it operates Ψ = {Ω,Z, P,Q}. Both the locations of all the other vacancies and the
positions of all the job seekers matter when determining a skills shortage.
3.3.2. Skills shortages.
Deﬁnition 3. Vacancy j experiences a skills shortage in economy Ψ = {Ω,Z, P,Q} if:
(3.7) Q(vj) +
∑
{ω∈Hj}
Q(ω) > P (Zj) +
∑
{ω∈Lj}
P (ω)
where Hj := {ω ∈ Ω|P (Zω ∩ Zj) = 0, ω = vj} and Lj := {ω ∈ Ω|ω ∈ Zu for u ∈
Hj, and ω /∈ Zj}.
The left hand side of eq.3.7 gives the total demand for workers qualiﬁed for vacancy
j. The ﬁrst term is j’s own demand. The second one sums up the demands from other
ﬁrms in the same economy that also want to hire workers who are qualiﬁed for vacancy
j (this is the subset of vacancies with skills vectors in Hj). The ﬁrst term on the right
hand side is the total supply of workers qualiﬁed for vacancy j, while the second one
adjusts this supply for the fact that ﬁrms with skills vectors in Hj, i.e. which compete
with j for the workers in Zj, also have access to a pool of workers that are qualiﬁed for
them but unqualiﬁed for vacancy j, and for which they do not compete with j.
To fully understand the condition for a skills shortage contained in eq.3.7, it is useful
to look at an example with two dimensions where the problem can be inspected visually.
Figure 3.2 illustrates three possible scenarios with two vacancies and two workers on
the same square lattice as the one introduced above.
Let the L, M, and R - subscripts stand for left, middle, and right panels of Figure 3.2.
The economy depicted in the left wing panel can be summarized by the quadruple ΨL =
{Ω,Z, PL, QL} where Ω is the square lattice, PL(s1) = PL(s2) = 1 with s1 =< 0, 2 >,
and s2 =< 3, 3 > and P
L(ω) = 0 for any other ω ∈ Ω such that ω = {s1, s2}. For the
vacancies, QL(v1) = Q
L(v2) = 1 with v1 =< 2, 2 >, and v2 =< 4, 4 > and Q
L(ω) = 0
for ω ∈ Ω such that ω = {v1, v2}. Furthermore, the qualiﬁed subsets are such that
PL(Z1) = 1 and P
L(Z2) = 0.
It is clear that vacancy 2 experiences a skills shortage since both potential applicants,
S1 and S2, lack some of the skills required for V2’s benchmark combination v2. Since
PL(Z1 ∩ Z2) = 0, eq.3.7 becomes: 1 + 0 > 0 + 0 so that vacancy 2 experiences a
shortage. By contrast, vacancy 1 does not experience a skills shortage when operating
in ΨL. The qualiﬁed candidate is S2, and there is enough of him/her because he/she
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Shortage for V2, not for V1 Shortages for both V1 and V2 No shortages
Notes: Three possible scenarios with two workers and two vacancies in a two-dimensional skills space
are illustrated. As S2 becomes qualiﬁed for both vacancies (going from the left to the middle panel),
there is no longer “enough” of him, so that both V1 and V2 experience skills shortages. Moving from
the middle to the right panel, both shortages are eliminated by simply making S1 qualiﬁed for V1, so
that there are enough qualiﬁed workers at the level of the economy to simultaneously ﬁll both
vacancies. Hence, the existence of shortages and the policies aimed at eliminating them cannot be
considered in isolation.
Figure 3.2: Skills shortages
is not also qualiﬁed for vacancy 2. Eq.3.7 in this case gives 1 + 0 ≤ 1 + 0 since
QL(v1) = P
L(Z1) = P
L(s2) = 1 and the second terms on both sides are still equal to 0
because PL(Z1 ∩ Z2) = 0.
Suppose we change the location of S2 from < 3, 3 > to < 6, 6 > while keeping
everything else exactly the same as before. This is illustrated in the middle panel of
Figure 3.2 . Worker 2 is now the only qualiﬁed candidate for both vacancies and so
there is no longer enough of him/her. Indeed, now PM(Z1∩Z2) = 1 and eq.3.7 becomes
1 + 1 > 1 + 0 for vacancy 2, and also 1 + 1 > 1 + 0 for vacancy 1, indicating a skills
shortage for both of them.
Finally, the right wing of Figure 3.2 moves job seeker 1 from s1 =< 0, 2 > to s1 =<
2, 4 >, keeping everything else as in the middle panel. S1 is now in Z1, i.e. qualiﬁed
for vacancy 1, while still remaining outside Z2. Graphically, it is obvious that there are
no skills shortages at the level of the economy ΨR because there are enough qualiﬁed
candidates to ﬁll both vacancies simultaneously. Simply assign S1 to V1 and S2 to
V2. The condition for a skills shortage in eq.3.7 is violated for both vacancies. For
vacancy 2, the equation reads 1 + 1 ≤ 1 + 1 since QR(v2) = 1, PR(Z2) = 1, and
PR(Z1∩Z2) = 1. Note how important it is not to forget the right hand side adjustment
PR(s1) = 1. Indeed, although S2 seems to be over-demanded since he/she is qualiﬁed
for both vacancies so that total demand for him/her is QR(v1) + Q
R(v2) = 2, while
his/her supply in the economy is only PR(s2) = 1, it would be wrong to conclude that
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V2 experiences a skills shortage because S2 is the only qualiﬁed applicant for it. The
reason is that, contrary to the situation in ΨM , in economy ΨR vacancy 1 does have an
alternative qualiﬁed candidate: S1. This example illustrates why skills shortages can
never be established in isolation because the “not enough” notion is deﬁned relative to
the space in which many heterogeneous vacancies and job seekers co-exist.
Another point to note when contrasting the middle and right panels of Figure 3.2
is that simply changing the location of worker 1 eliminates skills shortages for both
vacancies. This has an interesting policy implication. In employers’ surveys, ﬁnancial
services and engineering ﬁrms are often among those that are most concerned with
skills shortages, but for diﬀerent reasons (UKCES [18]). Financial companies often
cite the lack of computer/problem solving skills and the lack of understanding of the
ﬁnance industry as the two crucial deﬁciencies in their job applicants, while many
engineering ﬁrms are concerned that their most gifted and best qualiﬁed candidates
seek ﬁnance jobs because of the wage premium this industry is able to pay by leveraging
talent (Ce´le´rier & Valle´e [7]). Is having more graduates majoring in engineering the
optimal solution in this case? Maybe not. Top engineers would continue ﬂowing into
ﬁnance, while lacking some important ﬁnance industry knowledge. A more appropriate
solution might be to restructure ﬁnance/economics degrees so that students majoring
in them, who potentially have more of the relevant ﬁnance background, also get more
computer/problem solving skills. In terms of the spatial framework, this policy would
correspond to changing the location of ﬁnance/economics graduates in the skills space
in order to make them more attractive candidates for the ﬁnancial industry. This would
create more competition to the best engineering graduates, and force some of them back
into seeking employment at engineering ﬁrms. The example is a caricature of reality,
but a useful one to the extent that it illustrates how improving skills shortages for some
industry might also alleviate skills shortages in another industry.
A corollary is that when choosing among policies directed at reducing skills shortages
in diﬀerent industries, an authority should include in its costs/beneﬁts analysis the
positive externalities that each policy might generate on other industries.
3.4. Minimum levels of skills mismatches and skills gaps. We now focus on
determining the minimum levels of skills gaps and mismatches achievable in economy
Ψ, when the objective is also to match as many workers and vacancies as possible. From
a policy perspective, this is an interesting and important question since governments
are usually not only concerned with reducing skills gaps and mismatches, but also want
to leave as few unemployed workers and unﬁlled vacancies as possible.
We start with the following deﬁnitions:
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Deﬁnition 4. An assignment or matching of workers to ﬁrms is a one-to-one
correspondence μ : V⋃S → V ⋃S such that:
(1) μ(j) ∈ S⋃{j} for any j ∈ V ;
(2) μ(i) ∈ V⋃{i} for any i ∈ S;
(3) μ(j) = i ⇔ μ(i) = j, j ∈ V and i ∈ S, i.e. μ(μ(j)) = j.
The ﬁrst two points ensure that a vacancy can either be assigned to a worker in S or
left unﬁlled (assigned to itself: μ(j) = j). Similarly, a worker can either be assigned to
a vacancy in V or left unemployed (assigned to him/herself μ(i) = i). The last point
tells that if a vacancy is assigned to some worker, the worker has to be assigned to this
speciﬁc vacancy. We will sometimes refer to μ(X) as the match of X for X ∈ V⋃S.
Moreover, every assignment μ has an associated assignment matrix A = [aij] with
entries deﬁned as:
aij =
⎧⎨
⎩
1 if μ(i) = j
0 otherwise
Deﬁnition 5. Two measures P and Q deﬁned on a sample space Ω are equivalent if
and only if whenever P (ω) > 0 we also have Q(ω) > 0 and vice versa for any ω ∈ Ω.
Clearly, given a realistic degree of skills diversity in Ψ, and as long as the formation
of skill combinations on the supply side is not perfectly coordinated with the sets of
skills demanded, the two probability measures P and Q on Ω will not be equivalent.
If P and Q are not equivalent, at least some of the entries in the skills mismatch
matrix SM = [smij], where smij is deﬁned in eq.3.1, will be strictly positive. This
implies that in an assignment which minimizes the number of unassigned agents, the
minimum achievable sum of skills mismatches for the matched pairs - which we denote
by SMmin - will not necessarily be zero.
To ﬁnd SMmin, we solve a general assignment problem (Kuhn [23]) with anNxM cost
matrix SM. Since in general N = M the problem is unbalanced. In labour markets,
the number of unemployed usually outweighs the number of open vacancies, hence it is
plausible to assume that N > M . The mathematical problem is then to “pick exactly
one element in each [column] (ﬁll each open vacancy) in such a way that each [row]
(worker) is used at most once and that the total sum of the [M ] elements thus chosen
is minimal.” (Eiselt & Sandblom [11]). To balance the problem, we introduce (N −M)
dummy open vacancies that have zero skills mismatches with all workers. This gives
the transformed the NxN skills mismatch matrix S˜M. Any worker matched with a
dummy vacancy in the ﬁnal assignment will be considered as unmatched (μ(i) = i).
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The general assignment problem with NxN cost matrix S˜M can be solved as the
following linear programming problem:
(3.8) min
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
s˜mijaij
subject to: (1)
∑N
i=1 aij = 1 for j = 1, 2, ..., N
(2)
∑N
j=1 aij = 1 for i = 1, 2, ..., N
(3) aij = 1 or 0 for all i, j
Several algorithms have been proposed to solve this problem. The Hungarian algo-
rithm (Kuhn [23]) is the most famous and earliest one, but many other methods exist
(cf. Dell’Amico & Toth [3] for an overview).
There can be several diﬀerent assignments solving eq.3.8 subject to (1), (2), and (3),
but every such assignment μ with assignment matrix A = [aij] is optimal in the sense
that:
(3.9)
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
s˜mijaij ≤
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
s˜mij aˆij
for any other assignment μˆ with assignment matrix Aˆ = [aˆij] which also satisﬁes con-
strains (1), (2), and (3).
Since the dummy vacancies introduced have zero skills mismatches with all workers,
the minimum skills mismatch achievable in the initial economy characterized by the
measure space Ψ = {Ω,Z, P,Q} such that all M vacancies are ﬁlled can be computed
as:
(3.10) SMmin =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
s˜mijaij
If all vacancies are to be ﬁlled, a lower level of overall skills mismatches could only
be achieved by changing the locations of some agents. However, as soon as at least one
worker or vacancy is moved, the measure space and hence the economy change. For a
given Ψ = {Ω,Z, P,Q} and no unmatched vacancies, SMmin is therefore the minimum
possible sum of skills mismatches for the matched pairs.
From a policy perspective, suppose all vacancies in a given economy Ψ are ﬁlled and
the actual sum of skills mismatches is SMR. Knowing SMmin will be useful since if
SMR > SMmin, the policy maker knows that he could achieve a lower overall skills
mismatch level by simply reassigning existing workers among existing vacancies, i.e. the
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assignment itself must be ineﬃcient in terms of skills mismatches. On the other hand,
if SMR = SMmin, the matching is already optimal since it also satisﬁes constrains
(1), (2), and (3). A lower overall skills mismatch level could only be achieved by
implementing policies that change the locations of workers and/or vacancies.
The same exercise could be performed with the skills gap matrix SG instead of
SM. This would yield SGmin - the minimum skills gap level achievable in economy
Ψ = {Ω,Z, P,Q} such that all vacancies are ﬁlled. From deﬁnitions 1 and 2, it is clear
that SGmin ≤ SMmin since sgij ≤ smij for all i, j. Moreover, if SG = SM, the optimal
assignment(s) giving SMmin could be very diﬀerent from those resulting in SGmin.
4. A Spatial Model of the Competitive Labour Market with Imperfect
Information
The previous section created a framework for thinking about skills diversity and the
way in which it is perceived by opposite sides of the labour market. We shall now in-
vestigate how skills gaps, mismatches, and shortages inﬂuence the job matching process
and equilibrium outcomes in a competitive labour market with imperfect information.
Imperfect information implies that neither workers nor ﬁrms are able to perfectly ob-
serve the measure space of the economy Ψ = {Ω,Z, P,Q} in which they operate -
an assumption that seems reasonable for a labour market with large numbers of open
vacancies and job seekers at any point in time.
We start by determining how skills heterogeneity aﬀects agents’ preferences and pay-
oﬀs, then model the job application and competitive wage adjustment processes, and
discuss how skills heterogeneity inﬂuences competitive equilibrium outcomes.
4.1. Payoﬀs and rankings. As before, for simplicity, a ﬁrm operates exactly one
vacancy and can only hire one worker. Similarly, a worker can only be employed in one
vacancy.
Let wij be the wage that worker i ∈ S receives if employed in vacancy j ∈ V . The
determination of the competitive wage is discussed below. For this subsection it is
enough to think of the wage as some positive real number.
As discussed in section 3, we continue to assume that, when considering skills het-
erogeneity, workers only care about skills mismatches, whereas ﬁrms are only aﬀected
by skills gaps.
Speciﬁcally, the proﬁt of ﬁrm j that hires worker i ∈ S at wage wij is given by:
(4.1) πij = pjyj(sgij)− wij
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where 0 < pj < ∞ is the price charged by ﬁrm j and 0 ≤ yj(.) < ∞ is ﬁrm j’s speciﬁc
production function which is monotonically decreasing in sgij. Moreover, let πjj = ψj ,
i.e. when vacancy j remains unﬁlled, ﬁrm j receives an exogenously given ﬁnite amount
ψj. This amount can either be interpreted as the cost (if −∞ < ψj ≤ 0), or as the
present value (if ∞ > ψj > 0) of leaving vacancy j open. In either case, we take ψj as
given, constant, and known by ﬁrm j at any point in time.
Deﬁnition 6. At a given wage wij, worker i ∈ S is acceptable to ﬁrm j if and only
if πij = pjyj(sgij) − wij > ψj. Conversely, a worker is unacceptable if he/she is not
acceptable.
The deﬁnition simply says that at a given wage a worker is acceptable to a ﬁrm if the
ﬁrm would prefer to employ the worker at that wage rather than leave the vacancy open.
Note that a worker can be acceptable at a given wage w, but become unacceptable at
a higher wage w′ > w.
The utility of worker i ∈ S employed in vacancy j at wage wij is summarized as:
(4.2) uij = ui(smij, wij)
where ∂u
∂w
> 0 and ∂u
∂sm
< 0. Utility is decreasing in the skills mismatch smij because
being employed in a job that requires skills further away from his/her own combination
of skills is both costlier in terms of eﬀort and less satisfying for the worker. Let uii = κi
be the utility that a job seeker gets if he/she remains unemployed.
Deﬁnition 7. At a given wage wij, vacancy j ∈ V is acceptable to worker i if and
only if uij = ui(smij, wij) > κi. Conversely, a vacancy is unacceptable if it is not
acceptable.
Akin to deﬁnition 6, deﬁnition 7 just tells that a vacancy is acceptable to a worker
at a given wage wij if and only if he/she prefers to be employed in that vacancy at
wij instead of being unemployed and receiving utility uii = κi. Again, a vacancy can
be acceptable to a worker at some wage w, but become unacceptable at a lower wage
w′′ < w.
We also assume that proﬁts and utilities are independent across pairs, i.e. a ﬁrm does
not directly care about the proﬁts of another ﬁrm and a worker’s utility is unrelated to
the utilities of the other workers.
If worker i observes a given vector of wages wi =< wi1, wi2, ..., wiM > for all open
vacancies, and the ith row of the skills mismatch matrix smi, he/she can rank all the
open vacancies V by utility. Let R(i, wi) deﬁned on the set V
⋃{i} record this ranking.
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For instance, suppose M = 3 and at the given vector of wages wi, worker i prefers
vacancy V2 to V1 and would rather remain unemployed than work for V3. The worker’s
ranking can be summarized as: R(i, wi) = {V2, V1, Si, V3}.
Similarly, given a vector of wages wj =< w1j, w2j, ..., wNj > and the jth column of
the skills gap matrix sgj, ﬁrm j can rank all workers S in terms of proﬁts. Let R(j, wj)
deﬁned on the set S⋃{j} record this ranking.
We assume that the rankings R(i, wi) for any i ∈ S and R(j, wj) for any j ∈ V satisfy
the properties of complete ordering and transitivity. For the workers, complete ordering
implies that for any two open vacancies Vj and Vk, j = k, characterized by benchmark
skill requirements vj and vk and oﬀering wages wij and wik to worker i respectively, the
worker can always rank the two vacancies, and say whether or not these vacancies are
acceptable to him/her at the given wages. Transitivity implies that if worker i prefers
Vj to Vk, and Vk to Vh, j = k = h, at the current wages oﬀered, he/she must also prefer
Vj to Vh. The explanations of complete ordering and transitivity are similar on the
vacancies’ side.
4.2. Job application process. The ﬁrst step in the job matching process is the job
application. For a ﬁrm to be able to hire a given worker, this worker must not only be
seeking employment at the time when the ﬁrm opens its vacancy, but he/she must also
apply to be considered for this open vacancy before the closing date. It is thus very
important to understand what drives application decisions.
The outcomes of the application process can be summarized in a bipartite network.
The nodes on the two opposite sides of this bipartite network correspond to the two ﬁnite
disjoint sets of open vacancies V = {V1, V2, ..., VM} and job seekers S = {S1, S2, ..., SN}.
A directed link from S to V corresponds to a job application. The network therefore
records the application decisions of all N workers and is the pictorial representation of
the NxM incidence matrix/graph B with entries deﬁned as:
bij =
⎧⎨
⎩
1 if i applies to j
0 otherwise
As an illustration, Fig. 4.1 shows a simple network with only three vacancies and
four workers. The associated incidence matrix is:⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 0 0
1 0 1
0 0 1
0 0 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
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Notes: A link from a worker to a vacancy corresponds to a job application, e.g. S2 applies to both
V1 and V3.
Figure 4.1: Bipartite job applications network
Modelling the application process is therefore equivalent to modelling the formation
of the links in this bipartite network.
Links originate on the workers’ side and are directed towards the set of open vacancies.
Hence, those links, which lead to potential employment opportunities yielding higher
utility levels for the workers, should be relatively more likely to occur. This paper
assumes that workers’ utility is increasing in wages and decreasing in skills mismatches.
A worker should thus be more likely to apply to jobs that pay higher wages and/or
with which he/she has a lower skills mismatch.
Speciﬁcally, suppose that there exists a base wage wj for each ﬁrm j that can be
publicly observed. Either the ﬁrm posts this wage together with the benchmark re-
quirements vj when opening its vacancy, or workers can recover it from representative
datasets like the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ONS), or websites like Glass-
door where people share anonymously the salaries that they are being paid in their
jobs.4 The base wage wj therefore corresponds to the typical wage paid for this type of
job and at this speciﬁc ﬁrm. Later, we shall also interpret wj as the wage that a worker
receives if employed in vacancy j in equilibrium such that there is no network-based
competition for him/her. We take these base wages as given and exogenous, just as a
job seeker would do when looking at what wages diﬀerent ﬁrms typically pay.
We refer to the utility evaluated at the base wage as the ex-ante utility: uij =
ui(smij, wj), to diﬀerentiate it from the ex-post utility which is evaluated at the ﬁnal
competitive wage wij that i receives in case he/she is matched with j in the competitive
equilibrium.
With perfect information about Ψ and wj, each worker i should be able to compute
an ex-ante utility uij = ui(smij, wj) for all j ∈ V and therefore rank all open vacan-
cies. However, in a large real labour market with imperfect information, it would be
4See http://www.glassdoor.co.uk/.
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unreasonable to expect such a complete preference list from any job seeker. The worker
might simply not be able to observe all suitable open vacancies. There could also be
some uncertainty about either smij or wj.
To incorporate imperfect information, uncertainty, and unobserved intrinsic prefer-
ences into the application process, we propose a model for the formation of the bipartite
job applications network that is inspired from the literature on spatial graphs. How-
ever, contrary to the standard spatial model in which “nodes are embedded in a metric
space” and “link formation depends [only] on the relative position of nodes in the space”
(Janssen [20]), we shall assume that link formation is inﬂuenced by overall ex-ante util-
ity levels, and therefore not only the skills mismatches but also the base wages.
Intuitively, the probability of a link forming from Si to Vj in the bipartite network,
which corresponds to the probability with which worker i applies to vacancy j, shall be
increasing in the utility that i would get if employed at j: pij = pi(ui(smij, wj)) with
∂p
∂u
> 0. We use the ex-ante utility because the worker cannot foresee the competitive
wage he receives in equilibrium. To determine this wage, he/she would need to know
how much competition there will be for him/her, if any. However, the latter will
depend on the outside opportunities of the ﬁrms to which the worker applies - the
other applicants for the same vacancies - which the worker cannot observe. Indeed,
the worker is unaware of the application decisions of all the other job seekers because
he/she does not know the complete measure space Ψ.
To some extent, the spatial labour market model presented here can be seen as
a standard spatial model on the skills space, in which the relative positions of the
nodes have been deformed by ﬁrms being able to pay diﬀerent base wages. If wages
did not enter the utility functions, workers would indeed be most likely to apply to
those jobs that match their skills combinations the best. However, anecdotal evidence
suggests that the base wage a person expects to be paid in a given job is an important
determinant of the application decision. Workers are consciously willing to experience a
higher degree of skills mismatch in exchange for a higher wage, and therefore base their
application decisions on the overall ex-ante utility they could get in the job considered.
In order to overcome the requirement of perfect information, we assume that given
wj and vj for all j ∈ V , there does exist for each worker i, a latent ranking of vacancies
R(i, wi). Nevertheless, this ranking does not have to be observed or known completely
by the worker, since its sole function is to determine for each worker i, a latent applica-
tion probability distribution over the set of vacancies V . The only requirement is that
application probabilities pij satisfy for all i ∈ S and j ∈ V :
(1) pij ∈ [0, 1];
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(2) if ui(smik, wk) > ui(smih, wh), k = h, then pik > pih;
(3) pik(ui(smik, wk)) = 0 for any vacancy k that is unacceptable to worker i at wk.
The resulting bipartite applications network is “self-organizing” because it is “formed
by individual actions of autonomous agents” (Janssen [20]). Furthermore, despite being
driven by skills mismatches and base wages through their eﬀect on utilities and appli-
cation probabilities, the job application process remains stochastic, thereby capturing
unobserved individual intrinsic preferences for certain positions, uncertainty about ei-
ther smij or wj, and/or information frictions (with positive probability workers are
unaware of the best opportunities available to them in the labour market and hence do
not apply for them).
Another characteristic that a realistic application process shall exhibit is a diﬀerent
number of applications per job seeker. Incorporating this feature and understanding
why some workers only apply to one or two vacancies, while others apply to many,
is important as this plays a crucial role in determining the outside opportunities of
the ﬁrms and the workers in the competitive adjustment process analysed below. It
is reasonable to assume that the cost of applying is decreasing in the skills mismatch
(it is easier to write a cover letter for a job that requires your speciﬁc combination of
skills). Workers are therefore more likely to apply to jobs where their skills mismatch is
lower, which just reinforces the eﬀect of skills mismatches on application probabilities
that was already present through their eﬀect on utility.
To allow for diﬀerent numbers of applications per worker, we assume that, for each
Si, the set of links in the bipartite network (the application decisions) is formed by
K random draws with replacement from the worker-speciﬁc application probabilities
distribution over the set of vacancies V = {V1, V2, ..., VM}. K is some positive integer
and we erase all multiple applications from one worker to the same vacancy. This last
step not only yields the desired result of having diﬀerent numbers of applications per
worker, but also the following intuitive insight: those workers for whom there exists a
small number of vacancies that provide much higher utility than all the other ones, will
on average apply to fewer jobs. In some sense, for these workers there exists one best
job proﬁle that acts as a focal point and a larger part of their K applications will be
allocated to applying to the job(s) that correspond(s) to this proﬁle. Since any multiple
applications are erased, the total number of their applications will be smaller than the
average. On the contrary, for those workers who have a relatively general combination
of skills and for whom there does not exist one best job proﬁle, application decisions
will be more widespread and numerous.
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The importance of properly modelling and understanding the application process
cannot be overstated. Indeed, competition for workers does not happen at the level of
the economy, but exclusively on the bipartite network formed through the simultaneous
application decisions of all workers. Hence, the bipartite applications network deter-
mines the outside opportunities of both the workers and the ﬁrms in the competitive
adjustment process that leads to the local (network-based) equilibrium outcomes.
4.3. Competitive wage adjustment. In the bipartite applications network, whose
formation was studied in the previous subsection, a ﬁrm potentially receives zero, one
or several applications for its open vacancy. Similarly, a worker applies to zero, one or
several open vacancies. The network therefore deﬁnes the outside opportunities for all
agents. The objective is now to model competition for workers on this bipartite network.
We start with several deﬁnitions, then propose a competitive wage adjustment process
meant to mimic the way in which ﬁrms compete for the workers who have applied for
their open vacancies.
In this section, in order to simplify some of the proofs, we shall assume that the level
of heterogeneity - the n-dimensionality of the skills space Ω - is such that given a wage
vector w, a worker is never indiﬀerent between two separate vacancies, or a vacancy
and being unmatched. Similarly, given w, an employer can always determine whether
or not a candidate is acceptable, and for any two acceptable candidates, say which one
he prefers.5
Deﬁnition 8. An individually rational outcome of the labour market is a one-to-
one assignment of workers to vacancies μ and a wage vector w such that:
• At w, workers are acceptable to the vacancies they are assigned to at μ:
πμ(j)j = pjyj(sgμ(j)j)− wμ(j)j ≥ ψj
for all j ∈ V , and πμ(j)j = ψj iﬀ μ(j) = j;
• At w, vacancies are acceptable to the workers they are assigned to at μ:
uiμ(i) = ui(smiμ(i), wiμ(i)) ≥ κi
for all i ∈ S, and uiμ(i) = κi iﬀ μ(i) = i.
Deﬁnition 9. An outcome in the core is an individually rational outcome (μ, w) such
that no worker-vacancy pair (i, j), with μ(i) = j, can negotiate a salary w˜ij such that:
• Si prefers Vj at w˜ij to his/her match at (μ, w):
5A more general treatment could be undertaken in future research, although this assumption is prob-
ably not too far away from reality; when comparing two alternatives, it is often possible to ﬁnd one
small extra characteristic that will make us decide in favour of one or the other.
SKILLS DIVERSITY IN UNITY 26
ui(smij, w˜ij) > ui(smiμ(i), wiμ(i));
• Vj prefers Si at w˜ij to its match at (μ, w):
πij = pjyj(sgij)− w˜ij > πμ(j)j = pjyj(sgμ(j)j)− wμ(j)j.
Deﬁnition 10. An assignment μ respects an incidence matrix B if for all i ∈ S and
j ∈ V : if μ(i) = j then bij = 1.
In other words, an assignment respects an incidence matrix whenever a ﬁrm can only
hire a worker who has previously applied for its open vacancy, i.e. there exists a directed
link from this worker to the open vacancy in the corresponding bipartite applications
network.
Fix an incidence matrix B, formed as described in the previous subsection. The
competitive wage adjustment on the corresponding bipartite network is a discrete N -
dimensional time process [wij(t)]j, one for each j ∈ V , with wij(t) ∈ N for any t =
0, 1, ..., T , during which wages evolve as follows:6
• t = 0:
wij(0) =
⎧⎨
⎩
wj if bij = 1
∞ otherwise
i.e. ﬁrm j starts by considering all received applications at the base wage wj. We assume
that ﬁrm j never makes wage oﬀers below this wj for some institutional or reputational
reasons which we do not investigate here. Given the resulting initial vector of wages
wij(0) and the jth column of the skills gap matrix sgj, ﬁrm j can rank all acceptable
applicants, if any, in terms of time zero proﬁts:
πij(0) = pjyj(sgij)− wij(0)
Let the ﬁrm make a job oﬀer to its best candidate at time t = 0, Bj(0), if any, deﬁned
as:
Bj(0) =
⎧⎨
⎩
max{i|bij=1} πij(0) = pjyj(sgij)− wij(0) if πij(0) > ψj
Ø otherwise
Note that if the ﬁrm receives no acceptable applications for its open vacancy, i.e.
πij(0) < ψj for all i such that bij = 1, it makes no oﬀers at all, Bj(0) = Ø, leaves the
vacancy open and gets πjj = ψj > −∞.
6Note that the unit of the wage does not matter. It is only necessary that in each time period if a wage
rises, the increase is the same constant discrete amount for all ﬁrms and workers concerned. Similarly,
there is no obvious time interpretation for T. It should simply be conceived as the number of steps
necessary for the competitive wage adjustment to converge to an outcome in the core.
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• t ∈ [1, T − 1]:
A worker receives zero, one or several oﬀers. Since in the application process a worker
never applies to an unacceptable job and ﬁrms cannot oﬀer wages lower than the base
wages used by the worker to determine whether or not the vacancy is acceptable to
him/her, the worker never receives unacceptable oﬀers. Hence, we condition his/her
choice only on the subset of ﬁrms which made him/her an oﬀer in the previous step.
The worker will tentatively hold the best job oﬀer at time t, Hi(t), if any:
(4.3)
Hi(t) =
⎧⎨
⎩
max{j|Bj(t−1)=i} uij(t) = ui(smij, wij(t− 1)) if {j|Bj(t− 1) = i} = Ø
Ø otherwise
The worker tentatively rejects the rest of the oﬀers (if any). Until the very last period
T all rejections and acceptances of oﬀers are tentative because a tentatively rejected
ﬁrm can come back to the same worker with a higher wage. Indeed, after each round
of ﬁrm oﬀers and worker decisions, wages adjust as follows:
(4.4) wij(t) =
⎧⎨
⎩
wij(t− 1) + 1 if Bj(t− 1) = i and Hi(t) = j
wij(t− 1) otherwise
i.e. the wage of worker i at ﬁrm j rises by one unit at time t only if ﬁrm j made an
oﬀer to i at t− 1 and i tentatively rejected this oﬀer.
Given the new vector of wages wij(t), ﬁrm j re-optimizes. It recomputes all proﬁts
and makes a job oﬀer to its best candidate at time t, Bj(t), if any:
(4.5) Bj(t) =
⎧⎨
⎩
max{i|bij=1} πij(t) = pjyj(sgij)− wij(t) if πij(t) > ψj
Ø otherwise
Note that if ﬁrm j made an oﬀer at t − 1 that was tentatively accepted at t, the
problem at t is exactly the same as the one faced at t − 1. Thus, the ﬁrm makes
the same oﬀer to the same worker at t, i.e. Bj(t) = Bj(t − 1). This means that a
tentatively accepted oﬀer remains valid until the worker rejects it for another oﬀer that
gives him/her higher utility, if he/she ever receives such a better oﬀer before T . If this
happens, the problem for the previously tentatively accepted ﬁrm changes as the wage
of its previous best match increases. The ﬁrm re-optimizes and either chooses to come
back to the same worker with a higher wage oﬀering if at the new higher wage this
worker is still its best alternative, or opts for the new best alternative, which could be
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leaving the vacancy open in case all workers (including the one that was the best match
before the wage rise) become unacceptable at the new wage vector.
• t = T :
The competitive wage adjustment process stops when no tentative rejections are issued
so that all wages converge: wij(T ) = wij(T − 1) for all i ∈ S and j ∈ V .
The outcome of this competitive wage adjustment process is a matching μ and a
wage vector w, such that:
μ(i) =
⎧⎨
⎩
j iﬀ Bj(T − 1) = i and Hi(T ) = j
i otherwise
μ(j) =
⎧⎨
⎩
i iﬀ Bj(T − 1) = i and Hi(T ) = j
j otherwise
Wages are only deﬁned for the matched pairs, i.e.:
wij(T ) =
⎧⎨
⎩
wij(T − 1) if μ(i) = j
Ø otherwise
The payoﬀs on both sides can be summarized as:
uij(T ) =
⎧⎨
⎩
ui(smij, wij(T )) if μ(i) = j
κi otherwise
πij(T ) =
⎧⎨
⎩
pjyj(sgij)− wij(T ) if μ(j) = i
ψj otherwise
Deﬁnition 11. A local competitive equilibrium on a bipartite network with asso-
ciated incidence matrix B is an outcome (μ, w), such that (μ, w) is in the core and μ
respects B.
Theorem 12. Fix a bipartite network with associated incidence matrix B. The com-
petitive wage adjustment process [wij(t)]j, j ∈ V, t = 0, 1, ..., T , converges to a local
competitive equilibrium in T < ∞ steps.
To prove Theorem, we need to show that the outcome resulting from the competitive
wage adjustment process (μ, w) is individually rational, in the core, and the assignment
μ respects the given incidence matrix B. We establish the proof of the theorem through
a series of lemmas.
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Lemma 13. A worker who becomes unacceptable to a ﬁrm at step t < T, will never
become acceptable to this ﬁrm at a later step t′ > t.
Proof. If worker i becomes unacceptable to ﬁrm j at t < T, it must be because πij(t) =
pjyj(sgij) − wij(t) < ψj. By eq.4.4, at each iteration step in the wage adjustment
process, i’s wage can either remain constant or rise: wij(t
′) ≥ wij(t) for any t′ > t. This
implies that πij(t
′) ≤ πij(t) < ψj for any t′ > t and completes the proof. 
Lemma 14. The wage adjustment process results in an assignment μ that respects the
initially given bipartite applications network with associated incidence matrix B.
Proof. The wage adjustment process starts by setting wij(0) = ∞ for all workers i such
that bij = 0. This implies that any worker who has not applied for vacancy Vj in the
initially ﬁxed bipartite network becomes unacceptable already at t = 0 since for any
such i, πij(0) = −∞ < ψj. By eq.4.5, a ﬁrm never makes an oﬀer to an unacceptable
worker and by Lemma 13 a worker that becomes unacceptable to a ﬁrm at some t < T,
never becomes acceptable to this ﬁrm at a later t′ > t. This implies that, during the
wage adjustment process, ﬁrms only make oﬀers, if any, to workers who had previously
applied for their open vacancies, i.e. for which bij = 1. Any resulting assignment of
workers to vacancies produced by the wage adjustment process will therefore respect B
by construction. 
Lemma 15. For any i ∈ S and j ∈ V such that bij = 1 and worker i is acceptable to
ﬁrm j at wj, the competitive wage adjustment process {wij(t)} is bounded above.
Proof. The process starts by setting wij(0) = wj for all i ∈ S and j ∈ V such that
bij = 1. If worker i is acceptable to ﬁrm j at wj, the ﬁrm could make one or several
diﬀerent wage oﬀers to i during the wage adjustment process. The maximum wage
that ﬁrm j could ever oﬀer worker i is pjyj(sgij) − ψj < ∞. At any higher wage wij,
worker i becomes unacceptable to ﬁrm j and by eq.4.5 a ﬁrm never makes oﬀers to
unacceptable candidates. Furthermore, by eq.4.3, a worker only rejects a previously
tentatively accepted oﬀer if he/she receives an oﬀer from a diﬀerent ﬁrm which gives
him/her higher utility. Hence, the maximum wage w∗ij that ﬁrm j would ever have to
oﬀer to worker i such that he/she never rejects its oﬀer for another ﬁrm’s oﬀer, is such
that:
(4.6) ui(smij, w
∗
ij) = max
k =j
ui(smik, pkyk(sgik)− ψk) + ε
where ε → 0 and k is such that bik = 1 and i is acceptable to k at wk. Since pkyk(sgik)−
ψk is ﬁnite for all such k, w
∗
ij is also ﬁnite. Hence, for any i ∈ S and j ∈ V , such that
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bij = 1 and worker i is acceptable to ﬁrm j at wj, the competitive wage adjustment
process {wij(t)} is bounded above by
(4.7) supwij = min{pjyj(sgij)− ψj, w∗ij}
where w∗ij is deﬁned by eq.4.6. 
Lemma 16. The wage adjustment process converges after a ﬁnal number of steps T .
Proof. The wage adjustment process converges as soon as no tentative rejections are
issued and wages stop rising for all i ∈ S and j ∈ V .
The wage adjustment process is constant for any i ∈ S and j ∈ V such that bij = 0
(wij(t) = ∞ for all t), or such that bij = 1 and worker i is unacceptable to ﬁrm j at
wj (wij(t) = wj for all t). This occurs because ﬁrm j never makes an oﬀer to such a
worker.
Hence, we just need to show that {wij(t)} converges for any i ∈ S and j ∈ V such that
bij = 1 and worker i is acceptable to ﬁrm j at wj. For such (i, j) pairs, eq.4.4 implies
that {wij(t)} is monotonically increasing. By Lemma 15, we also know that {wij(t)}
is bounded above by supwij as deﬁned in eq.4.7. Since there are ﬁnitely many links in
the bipartite applications network on which competition for workers can happen, any
{wij(t)} will always either converge to its supremum supwij after ﬁnitely many steps,
or the wage will stop rising at a level below supwij which depends on the amount of
competition for worker i in the network. 
Lemma 17. The outcome (μ, w) to which the competitive wage adjustment process
converges is in the core.
Proof. By Lemma 14, μ respects B. It is trivial to show that μ is individually rational.
Workers never apply for vacancies that are unacceptable to them at the base wages,
and ﬁrms never oﬀer wages below the base wages. Hence, μ always assigns workers to
either themselves or to vacancies acceptable at w. On the ﬁrms’ side, eq.4.5 implies
that ﬁrms never make oﬀers to unacceptable applicants at any point during the wage
adjustment process. This proves that (μ, w) is individually rational.
Suppose that (μ, w) is individually rational, but not in the core. For this, there must
exist a worker-vacancy pair (i, j), with μ(i) = j, that can negotiate a salary w˜ij such
that:
• Si prefers Vj at w˜ij to his/her match at (μ, w):
(4.8) ui(smij, w˜ij) > ui(smiμ(i), wiμ(i))
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• Vj prefers Si at w˜ij to its match at (μ, w):
(4.9) πij = pjyj(sgij)− w˜ij > πμ(j)j = pjyj(sgμ(j)j)− wμ(j)j
Equation 4.9 implies that at some point in the adjustment process, ﬁrm j must have
made an oﬀer w˜ij to i. By eq.4.5 a ﬁrm’s decision problem remains the same over time
unless the worker rejects its oﬀer. Therefore i must have rejected j’s oﬀer at w˜ij since
otherwise, j would never have made an oﬀer to μ(j). By eq.4.3, workers reject an oﬀer
only if they receive a competing oﬀer that gives higher utility. This implies that i could
only have rejected j’s oﬀer at w˜ij because he/she had a better oﬀer wik from some ﬁrm
k at that time. Furthermore, the same argument implies that i’s ﬁnal oﬀer from ﬁrm
μ(i) at wiμ(i) must be at least as good as wik from k (with equality iﬀ μ(i) = k) :
ui(smiμ(i), wiμ(i)) ≥ ui(smik, wik) > ui(smij, w˜ij)
which contradicts eq.4.8 and proves Lemma 17.
Lemma 17 completes the proof of Theorem 12. 
4.4. Local competitive equilibrium outcomes. The impact of skills heterogeneity
on wages for those workers who are matched to vacancies in a local equilibrium can
be investigated by looking at the diﬀerence between the competitive wage they receive
and the base wage for their job: wij(T )− wj.
First, consider the case when wij(T ) = wj. This could happen for several reasons:
worker i applied to one or only a few jobs because his/her utility is very convex in skills
mismatches. Any small skills mismatch reduces utility by a lot. For this worker there
exists a speciﬁc job proﬁle to which he/she applies most of the time, thereby willingly
constraining any potential future network-based competition for his/her skills. As a
real world example, think about a PhD mathematician who decides to apply only for
academic positions, thereby constraining himself any potential competition that there
could be for his skills in industry or quantitative ﬁnance jobs and that could have
pushed his wage above base levels.
Another scenario for wij(T ) = wj is someone who has a rather general background
and applied to many diﬀerent jobs. His skills gaps are relatively large with most of the
vacancies to which he applied so that he is not a candidate for whom there would be
a lot of competition (as his wage starts rising he soon becomes unacceptable to many
ﬁrms to which he applied). This worker receives one oﬀer from some ﬁrm that did not
get any better candidatures and hires him at the base level.
Finally, wij(T ) = wj could also happen if i and j are close to a perfect match for each
other, so that once i gets an oﬀer from j he never wants to reject it for any other oﬀer,
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even when j is just oﬀering him the base wage. Potentially j is prepared to compete
for i but this never happens because i never rejects j’s oﬀer.
On the other hand, wij(T ) > wj indicates that there was at least one round of
network-based competition for the worker, i.e. the worker tentatively rejected the oﬀer
of his ﬁnal employer for a better one at least once in the negotiation process. For this
to happen, the worker must himself be of high calibre so that he gets several oﬀers
from diﬀerent employers, but also the worker’s ﬁnal employer must be in a situation
where he does not have better alternatives. This could be the case if the vacancy is
experiencing a skills shortage as deﬁned in section 3.3, so that the rest of the applicants
have relatively high skills gaps.
An important insight is that although employers in this model do not care about
the proﬁts of other rival ﬁrms, they care about both the skills gaps with their own
applicants and the skills gaps that the rival ﬁrms experience in their applicants’ pools.
Consider a ﬁrm that receives several applications with only one of them being qualiﬁed
for the vacancy. Even if it is able to hire the qualiﬁed candidate in a local equilibrium,
larger skills gaps in other candidates imply that the ﬁrm will compete for the qualiﬁed
worker more ﬁercely since the next best alternatives are not so attractive. If rival ﬁrms
are in a similar situation and compete for the same qualiﬁed worker, his wage could
rise well above the base level, eliminating most of the proﬁt for his ﬁnal employer.
Similarly, it is not necessary for some ﬁrm j to be experiencing a skills shortage (as
deﬁned in eq.3.7) in order to be induced to participate in network-based competition for
its acceptable applicants and potentially lose all of them. The latter could occur if the
ﬁrms competing with j for its qualiﬁed workers are willing and able to raise their wages
suﬃciently high. Vacancy j could also remain unﬁlled in a local competitive equilibrium
if the workers qualiﬁed for j in the economy are relatively unlikely to apply to j. For
instance, despite having zero skills gaps, the qualiﬁed workers could have substantial
skills mismatches with j. Even if they do have relatively low skills mismatches, they
could also be poached by other ﬁrms that oﬀer higher base wages. Finally, an unﬁlled
vacancy could simply be an unlucky realisation of the random application process.
5. Conclusion & Future Research
This paper designs a uniﬁed abstract framework that allows us to conceptualise skills
gaps, mismatches, and shortages geometrically. We then propose a job matching model
meant to mimic the real labour market. In a ﬁrst step, skills mismatches inﬂuence
the job application decisions of the workers, who do not have to possess the levels of
information and strategic sophistication often assumed in standard economic models
reviewed in Section 2. Job application decisions result in a bipartite network on which
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competition, shaped by skills gaps, mismatches and shortages, takes place in a second
step.
The skills space, job application and competitive wage adjustment processes can all be
simulated as part of an agent-based model, which in future research could be employed
to further investigate how skills gaps, mismatches and shortages aﬀect equilibrium
outcomes in the context of skills diversity in unity and imperfect information.
Another potential direction for future research is to recreate empirically the measure
space for the labour market of higher education graduates, i.e. project real world
descriptions of graduates and relevant job openings, together with quantity data, onto
a skills space whose dimension will be determined by how detailed the descriptions
are. For this, we would need to assemble a detailed list of skills that graduates acquire
while studying at university, i.e. create the skills space and construct the skills vectors
characterizing higher education graduates. This could be done by looking at speciﬁc
programme descriptions for each degree and university or using online datasources
like LinkedIn, where people often provide detailed information on the courses taken
and their own skills. To generate the measure of the combinations of skills supplied
(measure P in Section 3.3), we would then need to get data on the actual numbers of
students graduating in a given year by university and degree. A similar exercise would
have to be conducted on the labour demand side, e.g. by using online vacancies data.
The measure Q could be constructed from the numbers of job postings that speciﬁcally
oﬀer graduate employment or do not require substantial amount of work experience.
Once this is done, many interesting questions could be addressed and some policies
could be tested employing the techniques developed in Section 3. For instance, we could
ﬁnd out objectively (i.e. without asking the employers themselves) which vacancies are
experiencing skills shortages, what the minimum achievable levels of skills gaps and
mismatches are, etc. This approach would also allow us to experiment with nation-
wide or university-level curricula reforms, in order to see how they would reduce skills
gaps, mismatches, shortages, and improve higher education graduates’ employability.
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